{"id":16558,"date":"2023-09-18T19:41:58","date_gmt":"2023-09-18T19:41:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lawsuitlegit.com\/?p=16558"},"modified":"2023-09-18T19:42:00","modified_gmt":"2023-09-18T19:42:00","slug":"court-settles-camp-lejeune-attorney-drama-by-denying-willeys-motion-for-reconsideration","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lawsuitlegit.com\/court-settles-camp-lejeune-attorney-drama-by-denying-willeys-motion-for-reconsideration\/","title":{"rendered":"Court Settles Camp Lejeune Attorney Drama By Denying Willey’s Motion For Reconsideration"},"content":{"rendered":"
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\r\n                    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA\r\n                                 SOUTHERN DIVISION\r\n                                    No. 7:23-CV-897\r\n\r\n\r\n INRE:                                               )\r\n                                                     )\r\n CAMP LEJEUNE WATER LffiGATION                       )              ORDER\r\n                                                     )\r\n\r\n\r\n         On July 19, 2023, the court entered an order appointing a \"leadership group to fairly,\r\n\r\n effectively, and efficiently represent the interests of all plaintiffs ....\" [D.E. 10] 1. The leadership\r\n\r\n group is experienced and diverse, and the court's order detailed its expectations for the leadership\r\n\r\n group. See id. at 1-10. On August 16, 2023, a group of attorneys not selected for the leadership\r\n\r\n group led by Roy T. Willey, IV (\"Willey\") sought reconsideration of the court's order and argued\r\n\r\n that the court lacked authority to appoint the leadership group. See [D.E. 13] 4-5. Willey also\r\n\r\n argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was \"a perfect vehicle for consolidation and\r\n\r\n appointment of leadership\" and that he should be in the leadership group under Rule 23 because of\r\n\r\n his status as counsel in Williams v. United States of America, No. 7:23-CV-22-D (E.D.N.C.), a\r\n\r\n, p~tative class action under the Camp Lejeune Justice Act. See id. On August 28, 2023, plaintiffs'\r\n\r\n leadership group responded in opposition. See [D.E. 16]. On September 11, 2023, Willey replied.\r\n\r\n See [D.E. 21]. As explained below, the court denies Willey's motion for reconsideration.\r\n\r\n                                                    I.\r\n\r\n         On August 10, 2022, President Biden signed the Camp Lejeune Justice Act (\"CI.JA\") into\r\n\r\n law. See Pub. L. No. 117-168, \u00a7 804, 136 Stat. 1759, 1802-04. The CI.JA created a new federal\r\n\r\n cause of action permitting \"appropriate relief for harm that was caused by exposure to the water at\r\n\r\n Camp Lejeune\" for individuals who resided, worked, or were otherwise exposed for not less than\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n          Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 1 of 13\r\n\f30 days during the period between August 1, 1953, and December 31, 1987. See id. \u00a7 804(b). In\r\n\r\nthe CLJA, Congress established the burden of proof for this new federal cause of action against the\r\n\r\nUnited States, provided the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina\r\n\r\nwith \"exclusive jurisdiction\" and \"exclusive venue,\" and provided for jury trials. See id. \u00a7\u00a7\r\n\r\n804(c)-{d). Congress also abrogated the discretionary function exception otherwise available to the\r\n\r\nUnited States under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2680(a), prohibited the award of punitive damages, and provided\r\n\r\nthat the CLJA \"does not apply to any claim or action arising out of the combatant activities of the\r\n\r\nArmed Forces.\"      Id. \u00a7\u00a7 804(f)-(g) & (i).        Congress also required individuals to exhaust\r\n\r\nadministrative remedies under \"section 2675 of title 28, United States Code\" before filing a CLJA\r\n\r\naction in court. Id. \u00a7 804(h).\r\n\r\n        The CLJA applies \"only to a claim accruing before the date of enactment of this Act\" and\r\n\r\nincludes its own statute of limitations. Id. \u00a7 8040)(1 ). As for the statute of limitations, the CLJA\r\n\r\nstates that a \"claim in an action under this section may not be commenced after the later of (A) the\r\n\r\ndate that is two years after the date of enactment of this Act; or (B) the date that is 180 days after the\r\n\r\ndate on which the claim is denied under [28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2675].\" Id. \u00a7 804(j)(2). The CLJA also states\r\n\r\nthat\"[a]ny applicable statute of repose or statute oflimitations, other than under paragraph (2), shall\r\n\r\nnot apply to a claim under [the CLJA].\" Id. \u00a7 804(j)(3).\r\n\r\n        When Congress enacted the CLJA, Congress knew that this court has four United States\r\n\r\nDistrict Judges who would be responsible for handling all civil actions filed under the CLJA.\r\n\r\nMoreover, Congress did not dictate any case-management structure in the CLJA. To date, claimants\r\n\r\nhave filed approximately 93,000 admjnjmrative claims with the Navy for relief under the CLJA. To\r\n\r\ndate, 1,113 CLJA civil actions are pending in this court. The pending CUA actions involve at least\r\n\r\n49 diseases attributed to the water at Camp LeJeune. All CLJA actions will require the court to\r\n\r\n                                                    2\r\n\r\n         Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 2 of 13\r\n\fexamine exposure, general causation, specific causation, and (if reached) appropriate relief.\r\n\r\n        With respect to each United States District Judge on the court, Chief Judge Myers has 291\r\n\r\nCLJA cases. Judge Boyle has 261 CLJA cases. Judge Flanagan has 286 CLJA cases. Judge Dever\r\n\r\nhas 279 CLJA cases. As for total civil and criminal cases for the judges (including CLJA cases),\r\n\r\nChief Judge Myers has 880 cases. Judge Boyle has 1,313 cases. Judge Flanagan has 1,004 cases.\r\n\r\nJudge Dever has 1,009 cases. CLJA cases do not take priority on the docket, and this court must\r\n\r\nmanage the CLJA cases amidst an already heavy criminal and civil caseload.\r\n\r\n        Given the dire need to manage effectively the extraordinary volume of CLJA cases in this\r\n\r\ncourt and the volume of administrative claims that may become CLJA cases in this court, the court\r\n\r\nentered an order on April 25, 2023, inviting attorneys interested in serving in leadership for plaintiffs\r\n\r\nwith CLJA cases to apply to the court by May 26, 2023. See [D.E. 1]. On May 22, 2023, the court\r\n\r\nsupplemented that order. See [D.E. 4]. Willey was one of many attorneys who applied to serve in\r\n\r\nleadership for plaintiffs with CLJA cases.\r\n\r\n        On June 20, 2023, the court invited anyone who objected to the court's leadership process\r\n\r\nto notify the court. See [D.E. 6]. The court also announced that it would conduct finalist interviews\r\n\r\nfor leadership based on the submissions received, unless someone demonstrated good cause for not\r\n\r\nproceeding with the process for considering, interviewing, and selecting leadership. See id. at 1.\r\n\r\n        On July 11, 2023, Willey objected to the process and argued that the court should use the\r\n\r\n\"class action mechanism\" under Rule 23 to appoint interim class counsel to manage the CLJA cases\r\n\r\nand stated, incorrectly, that he had filed ''the first, and only, class action under the act.\" [D.E. 9] 2. 1\r\n\r\n\r\n        1\r\n          On August 14, 2022, the Bell Legal Group, LLC filed a putative class action. See\r\nStringfellowv. United States of America, No. 7:22-CV-145-M (E.D.N.C.). On February 14, 2023,\r\nChief Judge Myers dismissed that action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See id.,\r\n[D.E. 25]. On February 11, 2023, Willey filed a putative class action. See Williams v. United States\r\n\r\n                                                     3\r\n\r\n            Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 3 of 13\r\n\fWilley argued that because the CI.JA cases are not multidistrict litigation (\"MDL\") under 28 U .S.C.\r\n\r\n\u00a7 1407, then \"forcing consolidation on Plaintiffs' counsel is improper and against the spirit of the\r\n\r\nlaw.\" Id. at 1.\r\n\r\n        On July 13, 2023, the court interviewed ten candidates. Willey was not interviewed. On July\r\n\r\n19, 2023, the court selected one Lead Counsel, six Co-Lead Counsel, and two Liaison Counsel. See\r\n\r\n[D.E. 10] 1. The appointments were for a one-year term. See id. at 9. The court's order described\r\n\r\nthe responsibilities of Lead Counsel, Co-Lead Counsel, and Liaison Counsel. See id. at 2-5. Willey\r\n\r\nwas not selected. The court also authorized Lead and Co-Lead Counsel to select Plaintiffs'\r\n\r\nExecutive Committee members and Plaintiffs' Steering Committee members and described the role\r\n\r\nof the Plaintiffs' Executive Committee and the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee. See id. at 5-8. The\r\n\r\ncourt instructed Lead and Co-Lead Counsel to notify the court by July 31, 2023, about the members\r\n\r\nof the Executive Committee and Steering Committee. See id. at 5, 7. On July 27, 2023, Lead\r\n\r\nCounsel and Co-Lead Counsel notified the court who was on the Executive Committee and Steering\r\n\r\nCommittee. Willey was not selected to serve on either Committee.\r\n\r\n        On August 15, 2023, Willey wrote to Lead and Co-Lead Counsel seeking appointment to a\r\n\r\nsubcommittee with a preference for \"Bellwether, Resolution, or Discovery.\" [D.E. 16-2] 3. Willey's\r\n\r\nletter also stated, ''we are concerned that if we are not named to a committee role and have no say\r\n\r\nin the direction of the case as it pertains to our clients, we will be forced to appeal [the court's order\r\n\r\nof Julyl 9, 2023,] so as to protect our clients' interest in these cases and the processes used to move\r\n\r\nthem toward resolution.\" Id.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nofAmerica, No. 7:23-CV-22-D (E.D.N.C.). OnFebruary 12, 2023, the Bell Legal Group, LLC filed\r\nanother putative class action. See Gillam v. United States of America, No. 7:23-CV-98-D\r\n(E.D.N.C.). The Gillam and Williams cases are pending before Judge Dever.\r\n\r\n                                                    4\r\n\r\n         Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 4 of 13\r\n\f          OnAugust 16,2023, Willeymovedforreconsideration. See [D.E.13]. OnAugust28,2023,\r\n\r\nplaintiffs' leadership group responded in opposition. See [D.E. 16]. On September 11, 2023, Willey\r\n\r\nreplied. See [D.E. 21 ].\r\n\r\n                                                  II.\r\n\r\n          The court has the inherent power to reconsider an interlocutory order. See, ~ ' Am. Canoe\r\n\r\nAss'n v. Mur_phy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d SOS, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to avoid endless\r\n\r\nrelitigation of issues, however, reconsideration is granted in ''narrow circumstances: (1) the\r\n\r\ndiscovery of new evidence, (2) an intervening development or change in the controlling law, or (3)\r\n\r\nthe need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.\" Reale v. Wake Cnty. Hum. Servs.,\r\n\r\nNo. 5:ll-CV-682, 2013 WL 2635181, at \u2022s (E.D.N.C. June 12, 2013) (unpublished) (quotation\r\n\r\nomitted).\r\n\r\n       The court already considered and rejected Willey's core argument that the court should use\r\n\r\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3) to appoint interim class counsel to manage the CLJA cases.\r\n\r\nA ''motion for reconsideration is not properly brought to revive questions already decided on\r\n\r\narguments previously briefed or to present a more compelling argument.\" Jimenez-Orozco v. Baker\r\n\r\nRoofing Co., No. 5:05-CV-34, 2006 WL 8438693, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2006) (unpublished);\r\n\r\nsee Bald Head Island Ltd., LLC v. Ironshore -Specialty Ins. Co., No. 7:21-CV-177, 2022 WL\r\n\r\n17637455, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2022) (unpublished); Buckner v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No.\r\n\r\nS:09-CV-411, 2011 WL 1134219, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 24, 2011) (unpublished); McLaurin v. E.\r\n\r\nJordan Iron Works, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 2d 590, 596 (E.D.N.C. 2009). Thus, the court denies the\r\n\r\nmotion.\r\n\r\n       Alternatively, Willey has not identified any new evidence, intervening change or\r\n\r\ndevelopment in controlling law, or clear error or manifest injustice concerning this court's leadership\r\n\r\n                                                  5\r\n\r\n            Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 5 of 13\r\n\forder that warrants reconsideration. As for Willey's argument that no law or statute permitted this\r\n\r\ncourt to enter the order appointing a leadership group, Willey is wrong.\r\n\r\n       Federal courts possess certain \"inherent powers,\" not conferred by statute or rule, ''to manage\r\n\r\ntheir own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.\" Link v. Wabash\r\n\r\nR.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107\r\n\r\n(2017); Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-56\r\n\r\n(1936); United States v. Colon, 64 F.4th 589,596 n.7 (4th Cir. 2023); Attkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d\r\n\r\n606, 625-26 (4th Cir. 2019); Six v. Generations Fed. Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508, 519 (4th Cir.\r\n\r\n2018); United States v. Oliver, 878 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 2017). In exercising such inherent\r\n\r\npowers, the court must reasonably respond to ''the problems and needs confronting the court's fair\r\n\r\nadministration of justice.\" Dietz, 579 U.S. at 45. A court also must exercise its inherent powers\r\n\r\nconsistently with its powers contained in a rule or statute. See id.\r\n\r\n       The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are rules created pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act,\r\n\r\n28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2071-77. Section 2072(a) states: \"The Supreme Court shall have the power to\r\n\r\nprescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in United States\r\n\r\ndistrict courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.\" 28\r\n\r\nU.S.C. \u00a7 2072(a). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are law. See id.\r\n\r\n       The court entered its leadership order pursuant to its inherent powers to manage its own\r\n\r\naffairs and achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases and Federal Rules of Civil\r\n\r\nProcedure 1, 16(c)(2)(L), and 42(a)(3). Rule 1 states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\r\n\r\n\"should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just,\r\n\r\nspeedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Rule\r\n\r\n16(c)(2)(L) authoriz.es the court to \"adopt\u25a1 special procedures for managing potentially difficult or\r\n\r\n                                                  6\r\n\r\n         Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 6 of 13\r\n\fprotracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or\r\n\r\nunusual proof problems.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(L). As the Committee Note states, Rule 16(c)(2)\r\n\r\nauthorizes courts to use \"special pretrial procedures to expedite the adjudication of potentially\r\n\r\ndifficult or protracted cases . . . . No particular techniques have been described; the Committee felt\r\n\r\nthat experience and flexibility are the keys to efficient management of complex cases.\" Advisory\r\n\r\nCommittee's 1983 Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a)(3) states\r\n\r\nthat \"[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact,\" the court ''may ...\r\n\r\nissue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(3).\r\n\r\n       The CLJA actions pending in this district are potentially difficult or protracted actions that\r\n\r\ninvolve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, and unusual proof problems. The\r\n\r\ncourt has 1,113 CLJA actions pending today and faces the possibility of attempting to resolve\r\n\r\nanywhere from 100,000 to 1,000,000 civil actions under the CLJA. To date, pending CLJA actions\r\n\r\ninvolve 49 diseases. With respect to all the diseases, the court will have to examine exposure,\r\n\r\ngeneral causation, and specific causation. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. If a plaintiff's CLJA case can\r\n\r\nsurvive that examination, the court will have to hold jury trials in the cases and determine\r\n\r\nappropriate relief.\r\n\r\n       Federal courts can use their inherent powers, Rule 1, Rule 16(c)(2){L), and Rule 42(a)(3) to\r\n\r\nappoint leadership counsel in cases that are not MDLs or putative class actions. See, e.g., Link, 370\r\n\r\nU.S. at630-3 l; Payne v. Tri-State Careflight LLC, 327 F.R.D. 433,451 n.9 (D.N.M. 2018); Malden\r\n\r\nTransp., Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 323 F.R.D. 118, 120 (D. Mass. 2017); KBC Asset Mgmt. NV ex\r\n\r\nrel. Chemed Com. v. McNamara, 78 F. Supp 3d 599, 607--09 (D. Del. 2015); Resnikv. Woertz, 774\r\n\r\nF. Supp. 2d 614, 624-27 (D. Del. 2011). The Wright & Miller treatise recognizes a court's power\r\n\r\nto appoint \"lead counsel \" in \"complex litigation\" in order to ''reduce legal costs, mjnjmjz.e\r\n\r\n                                                  7\r\n\r\n         Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 7 of 13\r\n\fscheduling conflicts, and ameliorate communication problems.\" Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.\r\n\r\nMiller, Federal Practice And Procedure \u00a7 2385 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2005). The interests of\r\n\r\nappointing leadership in CUA cases is even stronger than in an MDL given that all CLJA cases are\r\n\r\nexclusively within the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.\r\n\r\n       The Manual for Complex Litigation advises courts that in complex cases \"the court will need\r\n\r\nto institute procedures under which one or more attorneys are selected and authorized to act on\r\n\r\nbehalf of other counsel and their clients with respect to specified aspects of the litigation.\" Manual\r\n\r\nfor Complex Litigation \u00a7 10:22 (4th ed. 2004). As the Manual explains, typically lead counsel \"act\r\n\r\nfor the group-either personally or by coordinating the efforts of others-in presenting written and\r\n\r\noral arguments and suggestions to the court, working with opposing counsel in developing and\r\n\r\nimplementing a litigation plan, initiating and organizing discovery requests and responses,\r\n\r\nconducting the principal examination of deponents, employing experts, arranging for support\r\n\r\nservices, and seeing that schedules are met.\" Id. \u00a7 10.221.\r\n\r\n       The court's leadership order advances these objectives in the CUA cases. The leadership\r\n\r\norder states that counsel to individual plaintiffs, whether or not in the leadership group, \"shall\r\n\r\ncontinue to be responsible for each individual plaintiff's case.\" [D.E. 10] 10. The leadership order\r\n\r\nalso preserves \"the right of any plaintiffs counsel to present any non-repetitive positions that\r\n\r\nuniquely affect an individual plaintiff.\" Id. at 2. It also withholds from the Plaintiffs' Executive\r\n\r\nCommittee the power to determine positions on matters \"solely related to an individual plaintiff.\"\r\n\r\nId. at 6. Thus, the court rejects as baseless Willey's argument that the court \"has effectively made\r\n\r\nindividual counsel unable to provide any direction or input to their clients' cases.\" [D.E. 13] 9.\r\n\r\n       As for Willey's argument that this court should use the Williams putative class action and\r\n\r\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g)(3) to appoint interim class counsel to serve as leadership\r\n\r\n                                                  8\r\n\r\n         Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 8 of 13\r\n\fcounsel, the court rejects the argument. At the outset, the court rejects Willey's implicit argument\r\n\r\nthat the court has only a binary choice: (1) use Rule 23(g)(3) to appoint interim class counsel to\r\n\r\nmanage the CLJA cases or (2) have each individual plaintiff pursue his or her own CLJA case\r\n\r\nindividually against the United States. Nothing in the CLJA, this court's inherent powers, or the\r\n\r\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure limits this court to that binary choice.\r\n\r\n       As for Willey's specific arguments about Rule 23(g)(3), those arguments do not mandate\r\n\r\nhis proposed approach. Although Willey filed a putative class action, Rule 23(g)(3) does not require\r\n\r\na court to appoint counsel for the first-filed class action to serve as interim class counsel. See, e.g.,\r\n\r\nMichelle v. Arctic Zero, Inc., No. 12cv2063-GPC (NLS), 2013 WL 791145, at \u20222 (S.D. Cal. Mar.\r\n\r\n1, 2013) (unpublished) (collecting cases). Rather, a court retains discretion in deciding whether to\r\n\r\nappoint interim class counsel. Moreover, when considering whether to appoint interim class counsel\r\n\r\nunder Rule 23(g)(3), the court should consider: (1) the work counsel has completed in identifying\r\n\r\nor investigating potential claims in the action; (2) counsel's experience handling class actions, other\r\n\r\ncomplex litigation, and the types of claims asserted in the action; (3) counsel's knowledge of the\r\n\r\napplicable law; and (4) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class. Fed. R. Civ.\r\n\r\nP. 23(g)(l )(A). The court also may consider \"any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly\r\n\r\nand adequately represent the interests of the class.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(B).\r\n\r\n       If a court has decided to appoint interim class counsel under Rule 23(g)(3) and multiple\r\n\r\nattorneys apply to serve as interim class counsel, the court should select the class counsel \"best able\r\n\r\nto represent the interests of the class\" considering all the Rule 23(g)(l )(A) factors and Rule\r\n\r\n23(g)(l)(B). Advisory Committee's 2003 Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(B); see, e.g., In re\r\n\r\nVan guard Chester Funds Litig., 625 F. Supp. 3d 362, 365-66 (E.D. Pa. 2022). \"The fact that a given\r\n\r\nattorney filed the instant action, for example, might not weigh heavily in the decision if that lawyer\r\n\r\n                                                   9\r\n\r\n         Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 9 of 13\r\n\fhad not done significant work identifying or investigating claims.\" Advisory Committee's 2003\r\n\r\nAmendment Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(B); see In re Vanguard Chester Funds Litig., 625 F.\r\n\r\nSupp. 3d at 366. Likewise_,if another plaintiff and his lawyer file a putative class action later than\r\n\r\nthe first plaintiffbut perform more substantive post-filing investigation and research of claims, then\r\n\r\nthe later-filing lawyer may be better suited to represent the class. See Outten v. Wilmington Trust\r\n\r\nCom., 281 F.R.D. 193, 199 (D. Del. 2012). Alternatively, if a later-to-file lawyer has performed a\r\n\r\nsubstantial investigation and has more potential class representatives or more experience, then that\r\n\r\nlawyer also may be a better representative ofthe class. See Calhoun v. Invention Submission Com.,\r\n\r\nNo. 2:19-CV-1396, 2020 WL 5016942, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2020) (unpublished); Cadena\r\n\r\nv. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. CV 18-4007-MWF, 2020 WL 3107798, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 9,\r\n\r\n2020) (unpublished); Lowery v. Spotify USA Inc., No. CV-15-9929-BRO, 2016 WL 6818756, at\r\n\r\n*3-4 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2016) (unpublished).\r\n\r\n        The court need not reach these issues under Rule 23(g). Merely because Willey filed a\r\n\r\nputative class action does not strip this court of its inherent powers or its authority to use Rules 1,\r\n\r\n16, and 42 to manage the deluge of CLJA cases in this district. Rule 23 's application in the CLJA\r\n\r\ncases raises complex issues that the court need not resolve at this time to manage these cases. Cf.\r\n\r\nOrtiz v. Fibreboard Com., 527 U.S. 815, 830--65 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.\r\n\r\n591, 612-29 (1997). Willey is obviously disappointed that the court did not choose to manage the\r\n\r\nCLJA cases in the manner he proposed. Willey appears equally disappointed that the court did not\r\n\r\nselect him as Lead Counsel or Co-Lead Counsel. The court, however, fairly considered Willey's\r\n\r\nmaterial and the material of all applicants. After a careful and thoughtful process, the court selected\r\n\r\nthe leadership group best able to fairly, effectively, and efficiently represent the interests ofplaintiffs\r\n\r\nwith CUA cases in this district. Willey's motion for reconsideration is denied.\r\n\r\n                                                    10\r\n\r\n         Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 10 of 13\r\n\fCase 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 11 of 13\r\n\fJUDGE DEVER, Concurring:\r\n\r\n       I concur fully in the court's order. I write separately as the United States District Judge\r\n\r\nassigned to both the Williams putative class action and the Gillam putative class action. I do not\r\n\r\nreach the propriety of either putative class action at this time. Nonetheless, I note that if I were to\r\n\r\nconsider appointing interim class counsel under Rule 23(g)(3), two factors that I would consider are\r\n\r\n(1) the work counsel has completed in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action, and\r\n\r\n(2) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(A).\r\n\r\n       As for counsel's knowledge of the applicable law, in the Williams putative class action,\r\n\r\nattorneys from Poulin, Willey, Anastopoulo, LLC presented five questions of law and fact\r\n\r\napplicable to the proposed class:\r\n\r\n       (i) Whether [d]efendant was responsible for the conduct alleged herein which was\r\n       uniformly directed at all servicemen and women stationed at Camp Lejeune during\r\n       the relevant period;\r\n\r\n       (ii) Whether [d]efendant' s misconduct set forth in this [c]omplaint demonstrates that\r\n       [d]efendant has engaged in unlawful and dangerous chemical contamination practices\r\n       with respect to the water sources at Camp Lejeune;\r\n\r\n       (iii) Whether [d]efendant made false and\/or misleading statements and omissions to\r\n       the [c]lass and the public concerning the contents of the water at Camp Lejeune\r\n       during the [r]elevant [t]ime [p]eriod; [and]\r\n\r\n       (iv) Whether [d]efendant' s false and misleading statements and omissions concerning\r\n       the water sources at Camp Lejeune were likely to deceive the public[.]\r\n\r\n       (v) Whether [p]laintiff and the [c]lass are entitled to money damages under the same\r\n       causes of action as the other [c]lass [m]embers[.]\r\n\r\n[D.E. 1] 18-19.\r\n\r\n       The first four proposed questions are irrelevant to a plaintiff successfully recovering under\r\n\r\nthe CLJA. As the CLJA makes clear, a plaintiff need only show \"one or more relationships between\r\n\r\nthe water at Camp Lejeune and the harm.\" CLJA \u00a7 804(c)(l). \"To meet the burden of proof\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n        Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 12 of 13\r\n\fdescribed in paragraph (1 ), a party shall produce evidence showing that the relationship between\r\n\r\nexposme to the water at Camp Lejeune and the harm is-\r\n\r\n       (A) sufficient to conclude that a causal relationship exists; or\r\n\r\n       (B) sufficient to conclude that a casual relationship is at least as likely as not.\"\r\n\r\nId. \u00a7 804(c)(2). Punitive damages are not recoverable under the CLJA. See id. \u00a7 804(g).\r\n\r\n       If I were considering whether to appoint Poulin, Willey, Anastopoulo, LLC under Rule\r\n\r\n23(g)(3) at this juncture, I would have serious concerns about counsel's knowledge ofthe applicable\r\n\r\nlaw in light of the first four purported common issues counsel identified in the Williams complaint.\r\n\r\nI need not reach the issue at this time, however, in light of this court's 1manimous decision to use\r\n\r\nits inherent powers and Federal Rules of Civil Procedme 1, 16, and 42 to enter the existing\r\n\r\nleadership order.\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n                                                  2\r\n\r\n        Case 7:23-cv-00897-RJ Document 22 Filed 09\/15\/23 Page 13 of 13<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA SOUTHERN DIVISION No. 7:23-CV-897 INRE: ) ) CAMP LEJEUNE WATER LffiGATION ) ORDER ) On July 19, 2023, the court entered an order appointing a “leadership group to fairly, effectively, and efficiently represent the interests of all plaintiffs ….” [D.E. 10] 1…. 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